Yes, it puzzles me that neuroscientists are so dogmatic on this point.Pwns wrote:There's no "leaning towards" it. It's practically taken as a given and is dogma to the point that you would be publicly ridiculed if you were a neuroscientist if you suggested there was any metaphysical workings of the brain. On some level there's nothing wrong with that as you cannot produce anything useful if you throw up your hands and just explain something as being supernatural or metaphysical. The convenient thing about physicalism, though, is that no matter how many times you fail to explain something physically you can always fall back on "we'll figure it out eventually, people once thought volcanic eruptions were acts of god".houndawg wrote:
Again, I hope you're right, but neuroscientists are leaning towards the so-called soul being part of the brain and not something that exists separately from the brain.
That's not really convincing to me, though. As I was telling Chizz in my AI thread, the puzzle of explaining consciousness is not just a scienctific puzzle, it's also a mathematical puzzle involving information theory and other branches of math most people don't even know exists. Roger Penrose really first suggested you needed to look at the quantum level to have any hope of explaining the workings of the brain, and gradually more mathematicians are coming around to the idea that replicating cognition with computer hardware and classical algorithms isn't possible. And if that is possible at the bare minimum you have to come up with a new physical model of how the brain works.
Quite simply, it is possible there are things that will continue to defy any attempted physical explanation no matter how much effort is put into it because they have no physical explanation. If you don't think that is possible you are not a true free-thinker.
I've spoken to a few neuroscientists about their collective certainty on this point, and asked, "Doesn't the mere fact we have metaphysical ideas and concepts prove that there is something metaphysical about the human experience?"
I have never really received a convincing answer. The best that they come up with is that our metaphysical concepts are themselves simply biological impulses of our brain function.
In other words, we are really no different that any other animal. We're just the most intellectually superior animal.
And, in their opinion (it seems), we are the most deluded of the animals.
I've tried to follow up by asking, "So then, as a neuroscientist, you are saying that we should ignore the abstract philosophical concepts of our higher brain function?" A number of them have danced around the question, but my favorite response was from the guy honest enough to say, "Yes."









