Boom!

[dbackjon]

IMO, yes. Doesn't mean I think the cartoonist should be fired. Just sayin it's tasteless IMO.

You should issue a Fatwa. That's what I do when people draw cartoons that offend me.

Is that a WaWa for the Obese?

[Ibanez]

You should issue a Fatwa. That's what I do when people draw cartoons that offend me.

Is that a WaWa for the Obese?

Get your own material.

[Ibanez]

I have just commissioned a new Fatwa against you.

I'm declaring jihad on both of your sorry, EC(b) asses.

I'm see your Jihad and raise you a Coalition of the Willing.

[grizzaholic]

I'm declaring jihad on both of your sorry, EC(b) asses.

I'm see your Jihad and raise you a Coalition of the Willing.

Coalition of the Willing you say...

3:30

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r7T9gicSnR0[/youtube]

[JohnStOnge]

Storing highly explosive materials immediately next to a neighborhood is not an acceptable risk.

That depends on what the actual risk is. I'm talking about putting a number on it. Once something happens the tendency is to say "that was a big risk" because it was realized. It's kind of like assuming there is a big "risk" of winning the lottery because somebody wins the lottery.

I don't know what an honest assessment of the probability of that explosion happening would have come up with before the explosion happened. But it's very possible the people in that neighborhood would've been seen as being far more at risk of being injured or dying from many other things that they accepted as part of their everyday lives.

And I don't know if anybody in the nearby neighborhood was killed. A quick Google search didn't answer the question for me. Just see that 11 of the 14 killed were firefighters. Chances are reasonable that, all other things being equal, those 11 would've been killed whether there was a neighborhood nearby or not.

I don't think we as a culture think rationally about risk. It's never zero and sometimes we act as though we think that's what it should be. We also gladly accept levels of risks associated with some things while trying to stamp out much smaller levels of risk associated with other things. The rational approach would be to always try to put an estimate of risk level on a situation or activity being considered in order to put it into objective context. The decision should be based on that risk level; not on how big a splash realization of the risk would make on the news. And there should always be some level at which we say, "You know what? We're not going to try to make it smaller. It's just not worth imposing the regulation it would take on people trying to go about their lives to do so."

We need to get rid of that "If it only saves even ONE life it's worth it" crap.

[andy7171]

I'm see your Jihad and raise you a Coalition of the Willing.

Coalition of the Willing you say...

3:30

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r7T9gicSnR0[/youtube]

Cradle of Civilization!

[kalm]

Storing highly explosive materials immediately next to a neighborhood is not an acceptable risk.

That depends on what the actual risk is. I'm talking about putting a number on it. Once something happens the tendency is to say "that was a big risk" because it was realized. It's kind of like assuming there is a big "risk" of winning the lottery because somebody wins the lottery.

I don't know what an honest assessment of the probability of that explosion happening would have come up with before the explosion happened. But it's very possible the people in that neighborhood would've been seen as being far more at risk of being injured or dying from many other things that they accepted as part of their everyday lives.

And I don't know if anybody in the nearby neighborhood was killed. A quick Google search didn't answer the question for me. Just see that 11 of the 14 killed were firefighters. Chances are reasonable that, all other things being equal, those 11 would've been killed whether there was a neighborhood nearby or not.

I don't think we as a culture think rationally about risk. It's never zero and sometimes we act as though we think that's what it should be. We also gladly accept levels of risks associated with some things while trying to stamp out much smaller levels of risk associated with other things. The rational approach would be to always try to put an estimate of risk level on a situation or activity being considered in order to put it into objective context. The decision should be based on that risk level; not on how big a splash realization of the risk would make on the news. And there should always be some level at which we say, "You know what? We're not going to try to make it smaller. It's just not worth imposing the regulation it would take on people trying to go about their lives to do so."

We need to get rid of that "If it only saves even ONE life it's worth it" crap.

Yes, how could people in this area have possibly known the risk?

That’s right. This fertilizer plant and other businesses in West apparently don’t pay enough in local taxes to support a municipal fire department, and so the first responders to a fire at a fertilizer plant were volunteer firefighters. Sadly, several of these volunteers are now missing:

The town’s volunteer firefighters responded to a call at the plant about 6 p.m., said Waco police Sgt. William Patrick Swanton. Muska was among them, and he and his colleagues were working to evacuate the area around the plant when the blast followed about 50 minutes later. Muska said it knocked off his fire helmet and blew out the doors and windows of his nearby home.

Five or six volunteer firefighters were at the plant fire when the explosion happened, Muska said, and not all have been accounted for.

Ammonium nitrate, one of the most commonly used fertilizers is also highly explosive. It was the primary component of Timothy McVeigh’s bomb that destroyed the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City. Texas, especially, should know of the dangers inherent in fertilizer plants, as this disaster occurs very near the anniversary of the Texas City disaster:

One of the worst disasters in Texas history occurred on April 16, 1947, when the ship SS Grandcamp exploded at 9:12 A.M. at the docks in Texas City. The French-owned vessel, carrying explosive ammonium nitrate produced during wartime for explosives and later recycled as fertilizer, caught fire early in the morning, and while attempts were being made to extinguish the fire, the ship exploded. The entire dock area was destroyed, along with the nearby Monsanto Chemical Company, other smaller companies, grain warehouses, and numerous oil and chemical storage tanks. Smaller explosions and fires were ignited by flying debris, not only along the industrial area, but throughout the city. Fragments of iron, parts of the ship’s cargo, and dock equipment were hurled into businesses, houses, and public buildings. A fifteen-foot tidal wave caused by the force swept the dock area. The concussion of the explosion, felt as far away as Port Arthur, damaged or destroyed at least 1,000 residences and buildings throughout Texas City. The ship SS High Flyer, in dock for repairs and also carrying ammonium nitrate, was ignited by the first explosion; it was towed 100 feet from the docks before it exploded about sixteen hours later, at 1:10 A.M. on April 17. The first explosion had killed twenty-six Texas City firemen and destroyed all of the city’s fire-fighting equipment, including four trucks, leaving the city helpless in the wake of the second explosion. No central disaster organization had been established by the city, but most of the chemical and oil plants had disaster plans that were quickly activated. Although power and water were cut off, hundreds of local volunteers began fighting the fires and doing rescue work. Red Cross personnel and other volunteers from surrounding cities responded with assistance until almost 4,000 workers were operating; temporary hospitals, morgues, and shelters were set up.

Probably the exact number of people killed will never be known, although the ship’s anchor monument records 576 persons known dead, 398 of whom were identified, and 178 listed as missing. All records of personnel and payrolls of the Monsanto Company were destroyed, and many of the dock workers were itinerants and thus difficult to identify. Almost all persons in the dock area-firemen, ships’ crews, and spectators-were killed, and most of the bodies were never recovered; sixty-three bodies were buried unidentified.

It would appear that Texas has learned very little from that disaster and still chooses to sacrifice volunteer first responders at the alter altar of free enterprise.

Special FREEDOM bonus: Did you notice the name of the street to the west of the middle school? It’s North Reagan Street, because, well, freedom.

Read more at http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/04/ ... XBDYUcU.99" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

[Ibanez]

I'm see your Jihad and raise you a Coalition of the Willing.

Coalition of the Willing you say...

3:30

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r7T9gicSnR0[/youtube]

I don't need to see that video to know one of the best lines. " I've got 40 nations, ready to roll son!"

[Baldy]

That’s right. This fertilizer plant and other businesses in West apparently don’t pay enough in local taxes to support a municipal fire department, and so the first responders to a fire at a fertilizer plant were volunteer firefighters. Sadly, several of these volunteers are now missing:

The town’s volunteer firefighters responded to a call at the plant about 6 p.m., said Waco police Sgt. William Patrick Swanton. Muska was among them, and he and his colleagues were working to evacuate the area around the plant when the blast followed about 50 minutes later. Muska said it knocked off his fire helmet and blew out the doors and windows of his nearby home.

Five or six volunteer firefighters were at the plant fire when the explosion happened, Muska said, and not all have been accounted for.

Ammonium nitrate, one of the most commonly used fertilizers is also highly explosive. It was the primary component of Timothy McVeigh’s bomb that destroyed the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City. Texas, especially, should know of the dangers inherent in fertilizer plants, as this disaster occurs very near the anniversary of the Texas City disaster:

One of the worst disasters in Texas history occurred on April 16, 1947, when the ship SS Grandcamp exploded at 9:12 A.M. at the docks in Texas City. The French-owned vessel, carrying explosive ammonium nitrate produced during wartime for explosives and later recycled as fertilizer, caught fire early in the morning, and while attempts were being made to extinguish the fire, the ship exploded. The entire dock area was destroyed, along with the nearby Monsanto Chemical Company, other smaller companies, grain warehouses, and numerous oil and chemical storage tanks. Smaller explosions and fires were ignited by flying debris, not only along the industrial area, but throughout the city. Fragments of iron, parts of the ship’s cargo, and dock equipment were hurled into businesses, houses, and public buildings. A fifteen-foot tidal wave caused by the force swept the dock area. The concussion of the explosion, felt as far away as Port Arthur, damaged or destroyed at least 1,000 residences and buildings throughout Texas City. The ship SS High Flyer, in dock for repairs and also carrying ammonium nitrate, was ignited by the first explosion; it was towed 100 feet from the docks before it exploded about sixteen hours later, at 1:10 A.M. on April 17. The first explosion had killed twenty-six Texas City firemen and destroyed all of the city’s fire-fighting equipment, including four trucks, leaving the city helpless in the wake of the second explosion. No central disaster organization had been established by the city, but most of the chemical and oil plants had disaster plans that were quickly activated. Although power and water were cut off, hundreds of local volunteers began fighting the fires and doing rescue work. Red Cross personnel and other volunteers from surrounding cities responded with assistance until almost 4,000 workers were operating; temporary hospitals, morgues, and shelters were set up.

Probably the exact number of people killed will never be known, although the ship’s anchor monument records 576 persons known dead, 398 of whom were identified, and 178 listed as missing. All records of personnel and payrolls of the Monsanto Company were destroyed, and many of the dock workers were itinerants and thus difficult to identify. Almost all persons in the dock area-firemen, ships’ crews, and spectators-were killed, and most of the bodies were never recovered; sixty-three bodies were buried unidentified.

It would appear that Texas has learned very little from that disaster and still chooses to sacrifice volunteer first responders at the alter altar of free enterprise.

Special FREEDOM bonus: Did you notice the name of the street to the west of the middle school? It’s North Reagan Street, because, well, freedom.

Read more at http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/04/ ... XBDYUcU.99" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Reads like a promotional spot for municipal firefighters.

[GannonFan]

Still trying to see what regulations Texas apparently did or didn't follow that led to this explosion. The plant submitted Tier II reports which detail what was stored there and the approximate quantities that where there. And those reports are shared at the state and federal levels and are common in the chemical industry, so plenty of people, from the state of Texas to the EPA, knew about what was there. Apparently Homeland Security didn't know what was there, because since 9/11 they want to know if anybody has sizeable quantities of ammonium nitrate. Not sure how they didn't know about this but it doesn't sound like regulations were lax that caused that, just normal bueracratic confusion.

While it's sensational to talk about the homes and other things nearby, was anyone there actually killed? It appears the bulk of the loss of life, other than plant personnel, were the volunteer firemen. And that's not a knock on volunteer firemen, although kalm comes pretty close to that in the article he posted. There are plenty of volunteer firehouses throughout the country and it has little to do with communities wanting to be cheap or miserly with their money. It's just common sense - in most places you don't need a full time, municipal fire company to combat the fires that happen. With the right training, and that's up to the volunteer fire company itself, those people can be just as qualified as any municipal firefighter. I work in the chemical industry over a few different employers and I've had volunteer fire companies inspect our facilities, go over what is stored there, and given them lists of what inventory could be here and the risks if any of that was exposed to flame. Sadly, it doesn't seem like the volunteer firemen in West knew about the dangers of heat and ammonium nitrate and that's the sad thing. Not some weird political angle to cast blame on one party or the other.

[YoUDeeMan]

Still trying to see what regulations Texas apparently did or didn't follow that led to this explosion. The plant submitted Tier II reports which detail what was stored there and the approximate quantities that where there. And those reports are shared at the state and federal levels and are common in the chemical industry, so plenty of people, from the state of Texas to the EPA, knew about what was there. Apparently Homeland Security didn't know what was there, because since 9/11 they want to know if anybody has sizeable quantities of ammonium nitrate. Not sure how they didn't know about this but it doesn't sound like regulations were lax that caused that, just normal bueracratic confusion.

While it's sensational to talk about the homes and other things nearby, was anyone there actually killed? It appears the bulk of the loss of life, other than plant personnel, were the volunteer firemen. And that's not a knock on volunteer firemen, although kalm comes pretty close to that in the article he posted. There are plenty of volunteer firehouses throughout the country and it has little to do with communities wanting to be cheap or miserly with their money. It's just common sense - in most places you don't need a full time, municipal fire company to combat the fires that happen. With the right training, and that's up to the volunteer fire company itself, those people can be just as qualified as any municipal firefighter. I work in the chemical industry over a few different employers and I've had volunteer fire companies inspect our facilities, go over what is stored there, and given them lists of what inventory could be here and the risks if any of that was exposed to flame. Sadly, it doesn't seem like the volunteer firemen in West knew about the dangers of heat and ammonium nitrate and that's the sad thing. Not some weird political angle to cast blame on one party or the other.

Today's forecast: heavy rain on dback's parade.

[kalm]

Still trying to see what regulations Texas apparently did or didn't follow that led to this explosion. The plant submitted Tier II reports which detail what was stored there and the approximate quantities that where there. And those reports are shared at the state and federal levels and are common in the chemical industry, so plenty of people, from the state of Texas to the EPA, knew about what was there. Apparently Homeland Security didn't know what was there, because since 9/11 they want to know if anybody has sizeable quantities of ammonium nitrate. Not sure how they didn't know about this but it doesn't sound like regulations were lax that caused that, just normal bueracratic confusion.

While it's sensational to talk about the homes and other things nearby, was anyone there actually killed? It appears the bulk of the loss of life, other than plant personnel, were the volunteer firemen. And that's not a knock on volunteer firemen, although kalm comes pretty close to that in the article he posted. There are plenty of volunteer firehouses throughout the country and it has little to do with communities wanting to be cheap or miserly with their money. It's just common sense - in most places you don't need a full time, municipal fire company to combat the fires that happen. With the right training, and that's up to the volunteer fire company itself, those people can be just as qualified as any municipal firefighter. I work in the chemical industry over a few different employers and I've had volunteer fire companies inspect our facilities, go over what is stored there, and given them lists of what inventory could be here and the risks if any of that was exposed to flame. Sadly, it doesn't seem like the volunteer firemen in West knew about the dangers of heat and ammonium nitrate and that's the sad thing. Not some weird political angle to cast blame on one party or the other.

I'll guarantee you local and state governments across the country are reviewing their inspection, safety and zoning practices. Regulation is a political topic both sides of which bare consequences. Might want to stick to the Locker Room Granny.

[HI54UNI]

That depends on what the actual risk is. I'm talking about putting a number on it. Once something happens the tendency is to say "that was a big risk" because it was realized. It's kind of like assuming there is a big "risk" of winning the lottery because somebody wins the lottery.

I don't know what an honest assessment of the probability of that explosion happening would have come up with before the explosion happened. But it's very possible the people in that neighborhood would've been seen as being far more at risk of being injured or dying from many other things that they accepted as part of their everyday lives.

And I don't know if anybody in the nearby neighborhood was killed. A quick Google search didn't answer the question for me. Just see that 11 of the 14 killed were firefighters. Chances are reasonable that, all other things being equal, those 11 would've been killed whether there was a neighborhood nearby or not.

I don't think we as a culture think rationally about risk. It's never zero and sometimes we act as though we think that's what it should be. We also gladly accept levels of risks associated with some things while trying to stamp out much smaller levels of risk associated with other things. The rational approach would be to always try to put an estimate of risk level on a situation or activity being considered in order to put it into objective context. The decision should be based on that risk level; not on how big a splash realization of the risk would make on the news. And there should always be some level at which we say, "You know what? We're not going to try to make it smaller. It's just not worth imposing the regulation it would take on people trying to go about their lives to do so."

We need to get rid of that "If it only saves even ONE life it's worth it" crap.

Yes, how could people in this area have possibly known the risk?

That’s right. This fertilizer plant and other businesses in West apparently don’t pay enough in local taxes to support a municipal fire department, and so the first responders to a fire at a fertilizer plant were volunteer firefighters. Sadly, several of these volunteers are now missing:

The town’s volunteer firefighters responded to a call at the plant about 6 p.m., said Waco police Sgt. William Patrick Swanton. Muska was among them, and he and his colleagues were working to evacuate the area around the plant when the blast followed about 50 minutes later. Muska said it knocked off his fire helmet and blew out the doors and windows of his nearby home.

Five or six volunteer firefighters were at the plant fire when the explosion happened, Muska said, and not all have been accounted for.

Ammonium nitrate, one of the most commonly used fertilizers is also highly explosive. It was the primary component of Timothy McVeigh’s bomb that destroyed the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City. Texas, especially, should know of the dangers inherent in fertilizer plants, as this disaster occurs very near the anniversary of the Texas City disaster:

One of the worst disasters in Texas history occurred on April 16, 1947, when the ship SS Grandcamp exploded at 9:12 A.M. at the docks in Texas City. The French-owned vessel, carrying explosive ammonium nitrate produced during wartime for explosives and later recycled as fertilizer, caught fire early in the morning, and while attempts were being made to extinguish the fire, the ship exploded. The entire dock area was destroyed, along with the nearby Monsanto Chemical Company, other smaller companies, grain warehouses, and numerous oil and chemical storage tanks. Smaller explosions and fires were ignited by flying debris, not only along the industrial area, but throughout the city. Fragments of iron, parts of the ship’s cargo, and dock equipment were hurled into businesses, houses, and public buildings. A fifteen-foot tidal wave caused by the force swept the dock area. The concussion of the explosion, felt as far away as Port Arthur, damaged or destroyed at least 1,000 residences and buildings throughout Texas City. The ship SS High Flyer, in dock for repairs and also carrying ammonium nitrate, was ignited by the first explosion; it was towed 100 feet from the docks before it exploded about sixteen hours later, at 1:10 A.M. on April 17. The first explosion had killed twenty-six Texas City firemen and destroyed all of the city’s fire-fighting equipment, including four trucks, leaving the city helpless in the wake of the second explosion. No central disaster organization had been established by the city, but most of the chemical and oil plants had disaster plans that were quickly activated. Although power and water were cut off, hundreds of local volunteers began fighting the fires and doing rescue work. Red Cross personnel and other volunteers from surrounding cities responded with assistance until almost 4,000 workers were operating; temporary hospitals, morgues, and shelters were set up.

Probably the exact number of people killed will never be known, although the ship’s anchor monument records 576 persons known dead, 398 of whom were identified, and 178 listed as missing. All records of personnel and payrolls of the Monsanto Company were destroyed, and many of the dock workers were itinerants and thus difficult to identify. Almost all persons in the dock area-firemen, ships’ crews, and spectators-were killed, and most of the bodies were never recovered; sixty-three bodies were buried unidentified.

It would appear that Texas has learned very little from that disaster and still chooses to sacrifice volunteer first responders at the alter altar of free enterprise.

Special FREEDOM bonus: Did you notice the name of the street to the west of the middle school? It’s North Reagan Street, because, well, freedom.

Read more at http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/04/ ... XBDYUcU.99" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Complaining that a town of under 3,000 people has a volunteer fire department may be one of the stupidest things I have ever heard. I wonder if the author has every been outside of a metropolitan area.

[Baldy]

Still trying to see what regulations Texas apparently did or didn't follow that led to this explosion. The plant submitted Tier II reports which detail what was stored there and the approximate quantities that where there. And those reports are shared at the state and federal levels and are common in the chemical industry, so plenty of people, from the state of Texas to the EPA, knew about what was there. Apparently Homeland Security didn't know what was there, because since 9/11 they want to know if anybody has sizeable quantities of ammonium nitrate. Not sure how they didn't know about this but it doesn't sound like regulations were lax that caused that, just normal bueracratic confusion.

While it's sensational to talk about the homes and other things nearby, was anyone there actually killed? It appears the bulk of the loss of life, other than plant personnel, were the volunteer firemen. And that's not a knock on volunteer firemen, although kalm comes pretty close to that in the article he posted. There are plenty of volunteer firehouses throughout the country and it has little to do with communities wanting to be cheap or miserly with their money. It's just common sense - in most places you don't need a full time, municipal fire company to combat the fires that happen. With the right training, and that's up to the volunteer fire company itself, those people can be just as qualified as any municipal firefighter. I work in the chemical industry over a few different employers and I've had volunteer fire companies inspect our facilities, go over what is stored there, and given them lists of what inventory could be here and the risks if any of that was exposed to flame. Sadly, it doesn't seem like the volunteer firemen in West knew about the dangers of heat and ammonium nitrate and that's the sad thing. Not some weird political angle to cast blame on one party or the other.

70% of all firefighters are volunteers, and most of them are as well trained and equipped as municipal firefighters. For whatever reason, it seems the douche in the blog post is trying to paint them in some sort of Keystone Cops type of light.

[GannonFan]

Still trying to see what regulations Texas apparently did or didn't follow that led to this explosion. The plant submitted Tier II reports which detail what was stored there and the approximate quantities that where there. And those reports are shared at the state and federal levels and are common in the chemical industry, so plenty of people, from the state of Texas to the EPA, knew about what was there. Apparently Homeland Security didn't know what was there, because since 9/11 they want to know if anybody has sizeable quantities of ammonium nitrate. Not sure how they didn't know about this but it doesn't sound like regulations were lax that caused that, just normal bueracratic confusion.

While it's sensational to talk about the homes and other things nearby, was anyone there actually killed? It appears the bulk of the loss of life, other than plant personnel, were the volunteer firemen. And that's not a knock on volunteer firemen, although kalm comes pretty close to that in the article he posted. There are plenty of volunteer firehouses throughout the country and it has little to do with communities wanting to be cheap or miserly with their money. It's just common sense - in most places you don't need a full time, municipal fire company to combat the fires that happen. With the right training, and that's up to the volunteer fire company itself, those people can be just as qualified as any municipal firefighter. I work in the chemical industry over a few different employers and I've had volunteer fire companies inspect our facilities, go over what is stored there, and given them lists of what inventory could be here and the risks if any of that was exposed to flame. Sadly, it doesn't seem like the volunteer firemen in West knew about the dangers of heat and ammonium nitrate and that's the sad thing. Not some weird political angle to cast blame on one party or the other.

I'll guarantee you local and state governments across the country are reviewing their inspection, safety and zoning practices. Regulation is a political topic both sides of which bare consequences. Might want to stick to the Locker Room Granny.

Have you ever been a part of an inspection of a facility? I don't think you have a grasp of what you're talking about here. You seem to place a lot of faith in an inspection being able to fix all the problems and eventualities that could happen. Heck, the anhydrous tanks at this facility, even after the explosions around them, held up, so it wasn't like this place was crumbling before this. OSHA hadn't done an inspection at this place in decades (which is common actually) because it didn't have any track record of complaints or incidents or anything else that would put in on a watch list. I'll grant you from a zoning standpoint they could force buffer zones between certain facilities and surrounding areas, but that won't change existing facilities anytime soon.

And the problem here was that there was a fire and the place had highly flammable materials and the volunteer fire company, in this case, wasn't prepared to deal with it. I know plenty of volunteer firemen and where I live they get excellent training. Why these guys didn't is more of the issue. That and why Homeland Security didn't know about the quantities being stored here in spite of the fact that there was a federally filed report that was pretty accurate (and other agencies, including the EPA and state offices, knew what was there).

It's great to preach on a message board that governments are going to review their practices, super. But how would that have stopped what happened at this facility? You seem to be of the part of society that sees the word "chemical" and goes "oooh, chemicals bad".

[kalm]

Yes, how could people in this area have possibly known the risk?


Read more at http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/04/ ... XBDYUcU.99" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Complaining that a town of under 3,000 people has a volunteer fire department may be one of the stupidest things I have ever heard. I wonder if the author has every been outside of a metropolitan area.

Good point. I wonder how close the nearest county station was.

[kalm]

I'll guarantee you local and state governments across the country are reviewing their inspection, safety and zoning practices. Regulation is a political topic both sides of which bare consequences. Might want to stick to the Locker Room Granny.

Have you ever been a part of an inspection of a facility? I don't think you have a grasp of what you're talking about here. You seem to place a lot of faith in an inspection being able to fix all the problems and eventualities that could happen. Heck, the anhydrous tanks at this facility, even after the explosions around them, held up, so it wasn't like this place was crumbling before this. OSHA hadn't done an inspection at this place in decades (which is common actually) because it didn't have any track record of complaints or incidents or anything else that would put in on a watch list. I'll grant you from a zoning standpoint they could force buffer zones between certain facilities and surrounding areas, but that won't change existing facilities anytime soon.

And the problem here was that there was a fire and the place had highly flammable materials and the volunteer fire company, in this case, wasn't prepared to deal with it. I know plenty of volunteer firemen and where I live they get excellent training. Why these guys didn't is more of the issue. That and why Homeland Security didn't know about the quantities being stored here in spite of the fact that there was a federally filed report that was pretty accurate (and other agencies, including the EPA and state offices, knew what was there).

It's great to preach on a message board that governments are going to review their practices, super. But how would that have stopped what happened at this facility? You seem to be of the part of society that sees the word "chemical" and goes "oooh, chemicals bad".

I was focusing more on the zoning aspect, and yes you cant prevent everything from happening, even with inspections..but since you bring it up i do believe in learning from mistakes. Have inspections and enforcement NEVER prevented accidents? Could they have prevented this one? Can they prevent or limit future incidents?

[GannonFan]

Have you ever been a part of an inspection of a facility? I don't think you have a grasp of what you're talking about here. You seem to place a lot of faith in an inspection being able to fix all the problems and eventualities that could happen. Heck, the anhydrous tanks at this facility, even after the explosions around them, held up, so it wasn't like this place was crumbling before this. OSHA hadn't done an inspection at this place in decades (which is common actually) because it didn't have any track record of complaints or incidents or anything else that would put in on a watch list. I'll grant you from a zoning standpoint they could force buffer zones between certain facilities and surrounding areas, but that won't change existing facilities anytime soon.

And the problem here was that there was a fire and the place had highly flammable materials and the volunteer fire company, in this case, wasn't prepared to deal with it. I know plenty of volunteer firemen and where I live they get excellent training. Why these guys didn't is more of the issue. That and why Homeland Security didn't know about the quantities being stored here in spite of the fact that there was a federally filed report that was pretty accurate (and other agencies, including the EPA and state offices, knew what was there).

It's great to preach on a message board that governments are going to review their practices, super. But how would that have stopped what happened at this facility? You seem to be of the part of society that sees the word "chemical" and goes "oooh, chemicals bad".

I was focusing more on the zoning aspect, and yes you cant prevent everything from happening, even with inspections..but since you bring it up i do believe in learning from mistakes. Have inspections and enforcement NEVER prevented accidents? Could they have prevented this one? Can they prevent or limit future incidents?

Like anything else, it's a cost-benefit analysis. What would be useful is to first find out what happened at this plant and how this tragedy actually ocurred. Talking about increasing regulations or inspections is a bit premature until we find out what happened and why. Heck, maybe the place needed a better sprinkler system (or needed one, not sure if they had one). Maybe that's the regulation that comes out of this. But we should probably take the first step and determine why this happened before we jump to the next step of preventing this from happening again.

[UNI88]

I was focusing more on the zoning aspect, and yes you cant prevent everything from happening, even with inspections..but since you bring it up i do believe in learning from mistakes. Have inspections and enforcement NEVER prevented accidents? Could they have prevented this one? Can they prevent or limit future incidents?

Like anything else, it's a cost-benefit analysis. What would be useful is to first find out what happened at this plant and how this tragedy actually ocurred. Talking about increasing regulations or inspections is a bit premature until we find out what happened and why. Heck, maybe the place needed a better sprinkler system (or needed one, not sure if they had one). Maybe that's the regulation that comes out of this. But we should probably take the first step and determine why this happened before we jump to the next step of preventing this from happening again.

Boom! Score:
Gannon Fan -3
Kalm - 0

GF gets assists from Baldy & Hi5 while Kalm's supporting cast has withered under the onslaught of logic and experience in the chemical industry.

[HI54UNI]

Complaining that a town of under 3,000 people has a volunteer fire department may be one of the stupidest things I have ever heard. I wonder if the author has every been outside of a metropolitan area.

Good point. I wonder how close the nearest county station was.

My guess is there is no such thing as a county station. More than likely the West, Texas volunteer department also covered the surrounding rural area. The nearest full time fire department is likely Waco.

[houndawg]

Good point. I wonder how close the nearest county station was.

My guess is there is no such thing as a county station. More than likely the West, Texas volunteer department also covered the surrounding rural area. The nearest full time fire department is likely Waco.

There isn't anything in west Texas worth saving if it did catch on fire.

[BlueHen86]

I was focusing more on the zoning aspect, and yes you cant prevent everything from happening, even with inspections..but since you bring it up i do believe in learning from mistakes. Have inspections and enforcement NEVER prevented accidents? Could they have prevented this one? Can they prevent or limit future incidents?

Like anything else, it's a cost-benefit analysis. What would be useful is to first find out what happened at this plant and how this tragedy actually ocurred. Talking about increasing regulations or inspections is a bit premature until we find out what happened and why. Heck, maybe the place needed a better sprinkler system (or needed one, not sure if they had one). Maybe that's the regulation that comes out of this. But we should probably take the first step and determine why this happened before we jump to the next step of preventing this from happening again.

There is no cost in telling the local fire department what is there and what the chemical properties are. Material Data Safety Sheets for many chemicals are readily available on the internet, and any decent test lab can get them for ones that aren't.

If the local fire department knew that the materials stored there were highly explosive when exposed to flame, and still rushed to the scene, then much of the tragedy falls on them.

If they didn't know, then it falls squarely on the owners of the fertilizer plant. Either way, this should not have come down to cost/benefit.

[BlueHen86]

Storing highly explosive materials immediately next to a neighborhood is not an acceptable risk.

That depends on what the actual risk is. I'm talking about putting a number on it. Once something happens the tendency is to say "that was a big risk" because it was realized. It's kind of like assuming there is a big "risk" of winning the lottery because somebody wins the lottery.

I don't know what an honest assessment of the probability of that explosion happening would have come up with before the explosion happened. But it's very possible the people in that neighborhood would've been seen as being far more at risk of being injured or dying from many other things that they accepted as part of their everyday lives.

And I don't know if anybody in the nearby neighborhood was killed. A quick Google search didn't answer the question for me. Just see that 11 of the 14 killed were firefighters. Chances are reasonable that, all other things being equal, those 11 would've been killed whether there was a neighborhood nearby or not.

I don't think we as a culture think rationally about risk. It's never zero and sometimes we act as though we think that's what it should be. We also gladly accept levels of risks associated with some things while trying to stamp out much smaller levels of risk associated with other things. The rational approach would be to always try to put an estimate of risk level on a situation or activity being considered in order to put it into objective context. The decision should be based on that risk level; not on how big a splash realization of the risk would make on the news. And there should always be some level at which we say, "You know what? We're not going to try to make it smaller. It's just not worth imposing the regulation it would take on people trying to go about their lives to do so."

We need to get rid of that "If it only saves even ONE life it's worth it" crap.

The actual risk is that if there is a fire the plant might blow up and kill anyone who is nearby. In this case that was the first responders.

Texas is a big state, there has to be a better place to store highly explosive materials. I know that they are proud of their lack of regulation and zoning, but this situation was caused by recklessness and stupidity, no matter how you try and excuse it.

[grizzaholic]

In this thread has anyone ever thought of quoting a post less than 40 sentences long?

[Ibanez]

In this thread has anyone ever thought of quoting a post less than 40 sentences long?

Montana really needs to get you all on a reading level of 5th grade or higher.